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CYBERHARASSMENT AND WORKPLACE LAW 
HELEN NORTON 
By documenting how cyberharassment can target and injure members of 
traditionally subordinated groups, Danielle Keats Citron’s Hate Crimes in 
Cyberspace contributes importantly to our understanding of the relationship 
between speech and equality. For these reasons, as her opening contribution to 
this online symposium makes clear, policymakers and the public are now 
starting to rethink their longstanding hands-off approach to the regulation of 
online speech that inflicts such harms. Here I very briefly explore what this 
might mean for workplace law. 
First, Professor Citron’s work and related developments invite us to broaden 
our understanding of the universe of actors who shape access to job 
opportunities, as well as our understanding of how they can use speech to expand 
or constrain those opportunities. Although employment law has traditionally 
focused on regulating the relationship between “employers” and their 
“employees,” the emergence of Uber, Lyft and other participants in the 
“sharing” or “gig” economy demonstrates how those who are hard to fit in 
traditional employer/employee categories increasingly control access to work. 
In describing the ways in which online harassers can limit their victims’ job 
prospects by damaging their online reputation with employers, potential 
references, and others, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace similarly encourages us to 
reconsider our assumptions about who holds power over important work 
opportunities.1 
This is not the first time that we have had to rethink our assumptions about 
the relationship between speech and the workplace. Recall, for example, the 
evolution of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: policymakers in 1964 first chose 
to regulate discrimination in employment largely because of its great harm to 
families’ economic security as well as to individual dignity and autonomy. Only 
decades later did courts, policymakers, and the public come to understand that 
illegal discrimination can include harassment, which often (but not always) takes 
the form of speech. More specifically, the Supreme Court ratified the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s position that employers’ unwelcome 
speech (or other workplace behavior) that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
 
 Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. 
1 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 158 (2014) (describing how 
cyberharassers “e-mailed damaging statements to [their victim’s] summer employer to 
prevent her from receiving a permanent offer; the entire Yale Law faculty, who would serve 
as future job recommenders, received e-mails with defamatory lies about her; readers were 
urged to contact law firms to talk them out of hiring her”). 
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create a hostile work environment can constitute unlawful discrimination by 
altering the target’s terms and conditions of employment on the basis of 
protected class status.2 In other words, just as compelling workers to endure 
miserable working conditions (e.g., assigning them an unforgiving schedule or 
a hazardous worksite) on the basis of protected class status alters the terms and 
conditions of employment in violation of antidiscrimination law, so too does 
creating miserable working conditions by requiring individuals to endure verbal 
abuse on the basis of their class status. For these reasons, courts and enforcement 
agencies have treated employers’ harassing speech as akin to coercive conduct 
unprotected by the First Amendment.3 
Although antidiscrimination law now recognizes that employers can drive 
women and people of color from the workplace (or can permit coworkers to do 
so) through harassing speech, it has yet to acknowledge that nonemployers can 
use online speech with the same intent and to the same effect. This suggests the 
possibility of expanding civil rights laws to prohibit those other than traditional 
employers from constraining job opportunities on the basis of protected class 
status. As Professor Citron writes, “Civil rights laws should penalize on-line 
harassers who interfere with someone’s right to pursue life’s crucial 
opportunities—work, education, and self-expression—due to group bias.”4 To 
be sure, our contemporary political climate of polarization and gridlock indicates 
that enacting such legislation would be no easy task, at least in the short term.5 
But the ongoing conversation itself remains of great value in illuminating our 




2 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
3 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (referring to Title VII as “an 
example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (“[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed 
not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by 
telling the enemy the Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a 
proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed 
at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ 
among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against sexual 
discrimination in employment practices.”) (citations omitted). 
4 CITRON, supra note 1, at 142. 
5 California may offer a counterexample. Professor Citron describes California law as 
permitting “civil penalties for bias-motivated threats or intimidation interfering with 
someone’s state or federal statutory or constitutional rights” that include employment and 
education, among others. Id. at 154. 
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Second, Professor Citron not only proposes new work-related legislation, but 
also draws from existing employment law to suggest that employers who rely 
on online reputation in screening applicants for hire may violate Title VII’s 
prohibition on disparate impact discrimination. More specifically, she proposes 
that 
[t]he EEOC could and should interpret Title VII to ban employers from 
using search engine results as the basis for denying individuals’ 
employment opportunities. Employers’ reliance on searches to research 
candidates has a disparate impact on women given the gendered nature of 
cyber harassment. Cyber harassment victims often have difficulty 
obtaining and keeping jobs because searches of their names prominently 
display the abuse. Employers admittedly rely on social media information 
in making hiring and hiring decisions.6 
Here the barriers to her proposal are legal rather than political. Recall that 
plaintiffs seeking to establish illegal disparate impact discrimination must start 
by demonstrating that the challenged practice causes an adverse impact based 
on protected class status.7 Even if the plaintiff makes such a showing, employers 
can successfully defend the practice by demonstrating that it “is job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”8 Plaintiffs may 
encounter difficulties in establishing, as a threshold statistical matter, that 
employers’ use of online search results imposes a disparate impact on the basis 
of protected class status. Plaintiffs may also confront challenges in rebutting 
employers’ likely assertions that online searches are in fact job-related and 
consistent with business necessity in that they may gather information relevant 
to employment decisions—e.g., by confirming applicants’ representations on 
their resumes. 
Despite these legal obstacles, here too there is great value simply in the 
conversation that such challenges would provoke, as they might well encourage 
employers to think hard about whether online searches are more likely to operate 
as discriminatory screens rather than as valuable sorting mechanisms. Indeed, at 
its best, disparate impact law encourages employers to reconsider and justify 
longstanding but often-underexamined practices. In this way, disparate impact 
law seeks both “to identify[] and reward[] individual merit as well as achiev[e] 
antisubordination goals[,] . . . ensuring that candidates are selected on actual 
merit rather than on unexamined yet entrenched assumptions that replicate 
 
6 Id. at 183. 
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). For example, applicant flow analysis (a common 
means of determining disparate impact) would assess whether online searches result in 
statistically significant differences between an employer’s selection rates for male as opposed 
to female applicants. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (explaining that federal enforcement agencies 
will generally consider as evidence of an employment practice’s adverse impact a selection 
rate for protected class members that is less than 4/5 of the rate for the group with the highest 
selection rate). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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patterns of subordination.”9 To this end, Professor Citron relatedly suggests that 
employers who receive training about the phenomenon of cyberharassment 
“would be more likely to scrutinize negative information appearing online and 
to appreciate its potential peril to traditionally subordinated groups.”10 
In short, Professor Citron has cast a spotlight on cyberharassment that 
valuably encourages us to consider how law might respond to the emerging ways 
in which speech can control and limit access to meaningful work opportunities. 
 
9 Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum 
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 250 (2010); see also id. at 253 
(“Disparate impact provisions’ attention to unjustified disparities also substantially enhances 
social welfare by improving the practices used to fill key positions.”). 
10 CITRON, supra note 1, at 184. For a related suggestion see id. at 184-85 (“Professor 
Frank Pasquale has proposed a fair reputation reporting act, which would require employers 
to reveal online sources that they use in evaluating applicants. The act would give applicants 
a chance to review the digital dossiers compiled about them.”). 
